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Abstract
Deep learning models have shown impressive perfor-
mance across a spectrum of computer vision applications
including medical diagnosis and autonomous driving. One
of the major concerns that these models face is their sus-
ceptibility to adversarial attacks. Realizing the importance
of this issue, more researchers are working towards devel-
oping robust models that are less affected by adversarial
attacks. Adversarial training method shows promising re-
sults in this direction. In adversarial training regime, mod-
els are trained with mini-batches augmented with adversar-
ial samples. Fast and simple methods (e.g., single-step gra-
dient ascent) are used for generating adversarial samples,
in order to reduce computational complexity. It is shown
that models trained using single-step adversarial train-
ing method (adversarial samples are generated using non-
iterative method) are pseudo robust. Further, this pseudo
robustness of models is attributed to the gradient masking
effect. However, existing works fail to explain when and why
gradient masking effect occurs during single-step adversar-
ial training. In this work, (i) we show that models trained
using single-step adversarial training method learn to pre-
vent the generation of single-step adversaries, and this is
due to over-fitting of the model during the initial stages of
training, and (ii) to mitigate this effect, we propose a single-
step adversarial training method with dropout scheduling.
Unlike models trained using existing single-step adversar-
ial training methods, models trained using the proposed
single-step adversarial training method are robust against
both single-step and multi-step adversarial attacks, and the
performance is on par with models trained using computa-
tionally expensive multi-step adversarial training methods,
in white-box and black-box settings.
1. Introduction
Machine learning models are susceptible to adversarial
samples: samples with imperceptible, engineered noise de-
signed to manipulate model’s output [15, 2, 34, 3, 13, 27].
Further, Szegedy et al. [34] observed that these adversarial
samples are transferable across multiple models i.e., adver-
sarial samples generated on one model might mislead other
models. Due to which, models deployed in the real world
are susceptible to black-box attacks [20, 28], where limited
or no knowledge of the deployed model is available to the
attacker. Various schemes have been proposed to defend
against adversarial attacks (e.g., [13, 29, 23]), in this direc-
tion Adversarial Training (AT) procedure [13, 35, 22, 40]
shows promising results.
In adversarial training regime, models are trained with
mini-batches containing adversarial samples typically gen-
erated by the model being trained. Adversarial sample gen-
eration methods range from simple methods [13] to com-
plex optimization methods [24]. In order to reduce compu-
tational complexity, non-iterative methods such as Fast Gra-
dient Sign Method (FGSM) [13] are typically used for gen-
erating adversarial samples. Further, it has been shown that
models trained using single-step adversarial training meth-
ods are pseudo robust [35]:
• Although these models appears to be robust to single-
step attacks in white-box setting (complete knowledge
of the deployed model is available to the attacker), they
are susceptible to single-step attacks (non-iterative
methods) in black-box attack setting [35].
• Further, these models are susceptible to multi-step at-
tacks (iterative methods) in both white-box setting [18]
and black-box setting [10].
Tramer et al. [35] demonstrated that models trained using
single-step adversarial training method converges to degen-
erative minima, and exhibit gradient masking effect. Single-
step adversarial sample generation methods such as FGSM,
compute adversarial perturbations based on the linear ap-
proximation of the model’s loss function i.e., image is per-
turbed in the direction of the gradient of loss with respect
to the input image. Gradient masking effect causes this lin-
ear approximation of loss function to become unreliable for
generating adversarial samples during single-step adversar-
ial training. Madry et al. [22] demonstrated that models
trained using adversarial samples that maximize the train-
ing loss are robust against single-step and multi-step at-
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tacks. Such samples could be generated using the Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD). However, PGD method is an it-
erative method, due to which training time increases sub-
stantially. Though prior works have enabled to learn robust
models, they fail to answer the following important ques-
tions: (i) Why models trained using single-step adversarial
training method exhibit gradient masking effect? and (ii)
At what phase of the single-step adversarial training, the
model starts to exhibit gradient masking effect?
In this work, we attempt to answer these questions and
propose a novel single-step adversarial training method to
learn robust models. First, we show that models trained
using single-step adversarial training method learn to pre-
vent the generation of single-step adversaries, and this is
due to over-fitting of the model during the initial stages of
training. Over-fitting of the model on single-step adver-
saries causes linear approximation of loss function to be-
come unreliable for generating adversarial samples i.e., gra-
dient masking effect. Finally, we propose a single-step ad-
versarial training method with dropout scheduling to learn
robust models. Note that, just adding dropout layer (typ-
ical setting: dropout layer with fixed dropout probability
after FC+ReLU layer) does not help the model trained us-
ing single-step adversarial training method to gain robust-
ness. Prior works observed no significant improvement in
the robustness of models (with dropout layers in typical set-
ting), trained using normal training and single-step adver-
sarial training methods [13, 18]. Results for these settings
are shown in section 4.1. Unlike typical setting, we intro-
duce dropout layer after each non-linear layer (i.e., dropout-
2D after conv2D+ReLU, and dropout-1D after FC+ReLU)
of the model, and further decay its dropout probability as
training progress. Interestingly, we show that this proposed
dropout setting has significant impact on the model’s ro-
bustness. The major contributions of this work can be listed
as follows:
• We show that models trained using single-step adver-
sarial training method learns to prevent the generation
of single-step adversaries, and this is due to over-fitting
of the model during the initial stages of training.
• Harnessing on the above observation, we propose a
single-step adversarial training method with dropout
probability scheduling. Unlike models trained us-
ing existing single-step adversarial training methods,
models trained using the proposed method are robust
against both single-step and multi-step attacks.
• The proposed single-step adversarial training method
is much faster than multi-step adversarial training
methods, and achieves on par results.
2. Notations
Consider a neural network f trained to perform image
classification task, and θ represents parameters of the neu-
ral network. Let x represents the image from the dataset and
ytrue be its corresponding ground truth label. The neural
network is trained using loss function J (e.g., cross-entropy
loss), and ∇xJ represents the gradient of loss with respect
to the input image x. Adversarial image xadv is generated
by adding norm-bounded perturbation δ to the image x. Per-
turbation size () represents the l∞ norm constraint on the
generated adversarial perturbation i.e., ||δ||∞ ≤ . Please
refer to supplementary document for details on adversarial
training and attack generation methods.
3. Related Works
Following the findings of Szegedy et al. [34], various at-
tacks (e.g., [13, 24, 8, 26, 25, 10, 12] have been proposed.
Further, in order to defend against adversarial attacks, vari-
ous schemes such as adversarial training (e.g., [13, 18, 22,
40, 5, 4]) and input pre-processing (e.g., [14, 31]) have been
proposed. Athalye et al. [1] showed that obfuscated gradi-
ents give a false sense of robustness, and broke seven out
of nine defense papers [6, 21, 14, 38, 32, 31, 22, 21, 9] ac-
cepted to ICLR 2018. In this direction, adversarial training
method [22], shows promising results for learning robust
deep learning models. Kurakin et al. [18] observed that
models trained using single-step adversarial training meth-
ods are susceptible to multi-step attacks. Further, Tramer et
al. [35] demonstrated that these models exhibit gradient
masking effect, and proposed Ensemble Adversarial Train-
ing (EAT) method. However, models trained using EAT
are still susceptible to multi-step attacks in white-box set-
ting. Madry et al. [22] demonstrated that adversarially
trained model can be made robust against white-box at-
tacks, if perturbation crafted while training maximizes the
loss. Zhang et al. [40] proposed a regularizer for multi-step
adversarial training, that encourages the output of the net-
work to be smooth. On the other hand, works such as [30]
and [36] propose a method to learn models that are provably
robust against norm bounded adversarial attacks. However,
scaling these methods to deep networks and large perturba-
tion sizes is difficult. Whereas, in this work we show that
it is possible to learn robust models using single-step adver-
sarial training method, if over-fitting of the model on adver-
sarial samples is prevented during training. We achieve this
by introducing dropout layer after each non-linear layer of
the model with a dropout schedule.
4. Over-fitting and its effect during adversarial
training
In this section, we show that models trained using single-
step adversarial training method learn to prevent the genera-
Figure 1: Single-step adversarial training: Trend of R, training loss, and validation loss during single-step adversarial
training, obtained for LeNet+ trained on MNIST dataset. Column-1: plot of R versus training iteration. Column-2: training
loss versus training iteration. Column-3: validation loss versus training iteration. Note that, when R starts to decay, loss on
adversarial validation set starts to increase indicating that the model is over-fitting on the adversarial samples.
Figure 2: Multi-step adversarial training: Trend of R, training loss, and validation loss during multi-step adversarial
training, obtained for LeNet+ trained on MNIST dataset. Column-1: plot of R versus training iteration. Column-2: training
loss versus training iteration. Column-3: validation loss versus training iteration. Note that, for the entire training duration
R does not decay, and no over-fitting effect can be observed.
tion of single-step adversaries, and this is due to over-fitting
of the model during the initial stages of training. First, we
discuss the criteria for learning robust models using adver-
sarial training method, and then we show that this criteria is
not satisfied during single-step adversarial training method.
Most importantly, we show that over-fitting effect is the rea-
son for failure to satisfy the criteria.
Madry et al. [22] demonstrated that it is possible to learn
robust models using adversarial training method, if adver-
sarial perturbations (l∞ norm bounded) crafted while train-
ing maximizes the model’s loss. This training objective
is formulated as a minimax optimization problem (Eq. 1).
Where ψ represents the feasible set e.g., for l∞ norm con-
straint attacks ψ = {δ : ||δ||∞ ≤ }, and D is the training
set.
min
θ
[
E(x,y)∈D
[
max
δ∈ψ
J
(
f(x+ δ; θ), ytrue
)]]
(1)
R =
lossadv
lossclean
(2)
At each iteration, norm bounded adversarial perturbations
that maximizes the training loss should be generated. Fur-
ther, the model’s parameters (θ) should be updated so as to
decrease the loss on such adversarial samples. Madry et al.
[22] solves the maximization step by generating adversarial
samples using an iterative method named Projected Gradi-
ent Descent (PGD). In order to quantify the extent of inner
maximization of Eq. (1), we compute loss ratio R using
Eq. (2). Loss ratio is defined as the ratio of loss on the ad-
versarial samples to the loss on its corresponding clean sam-
ples for a given perturbation size . The metric R captures
the extent of inner maximization achieved by the generated
adversarial samples i.e., factor by which loss has increased
by perturbing the clean samples.
A sample is said to be an adversarial sample if it is capa-
ble of manipulating the model’s prediction. Such manipu-
lations could be achieved by perturbing the samples along
the adversarial direction [13]. A perturbation is said to
be an adversarial perturbation when it causes loss on the
perturbed sample to increase. This implies that the loss
on the adversarially perturbed samples should be greater
than the loss on the corresponding unperturbed samples i.e.,
lossadv > lossclean. Based on these facts, R can be inter-
preted in the following manner:
• Generated perturbation is said to be an adversarial per-
turbation if R >1 i.e., lossadv > lossclean
• R <1 i.e., lossadv < lossclean, implies that the gen-
erated perturbation is not an adversarial perturbation.
The attack method fails to generate adversarial per-
turbations for the given model.
We obtain the plot of R versus iteration for models
trained using single-step adversarial training method [13]
and multi-step adversarial training method [22]. Column-1
of Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show these plots obtained for LeNet+
trained on MNIST dataset [19] using single-step and multi-
step adversarial training methods respectively. It can be
observed that during single-step adversarial training, R
initially increases and then starts to decay rapidly. Fur-
ther R becomes less than one after 20 (×100) iterations.
This implies that single-step adversarial sample generation
method is unable to generate adversarial perturbations for
the model, leading to adversarial training without useful ad-
versarial samples.
We demonstrate this behavior of the model to prevent the
inclusion of adversarial samples is due to over-fitting on the
adversarial samples. Typically during normal training, loss
on the validation set is monitored to detect over-fitting ef-
fect i.e., validation loss increases when the model starts to
over-fit on the training set. Unlike normal training, during
adversarial training we monitor the loss on the clean and
adversarial validation set. A normally trained model is used
for generating adversarial validation set, so as to ensure that
the generated adversarial validation samples are indepen-
dent of the model being trained. Column-2 and column-
3 of Fig. 1 shows the plot of loss versus iteration during
training of LeNet+ on MNIST dataset using single-step ad-
versarial training. It can be observed that, when R starts
to decay, loss on the adversarial validation set starts to in-
crease. This increase in the validation loss indicates over-
fitting of the model on the single-step adversaries. Whereas,
during multi-step adversarial training method, R initially
increases and then saturates (column-1, Fig. 2). Further, no
such over-fitting effect is observed for the entire training
duration (column-3, Fig. 2). Note that, a normally trained
model was used for generating FGSM (=0.3) adversarial
validation set, and we observe similar trend if a normally
trained model of different architecture is used for generat-
ing FGSM adversarial validation set, please refer to supple-
mentary document.
4.1. Effect of dropout layer
In the previous section, we showed that models trained
using single-step adversarial training learn to prevent the
generation of single-step adversaries. Further, we demon-
strated that this behavior of models is due to over-fitting.
Dropout layer [33] has been shown to be effective in miti-
gating over-fitting during training, and typically dropout-1D
layer is added after FC+ReLU layers in the networks. We
refer to this setting as typical setting. Prior works which
used dropout layer during single-step adversarial training
observed no significant improvement in the model’s robust-
ness. This is due to the use of dropout layer in typical set-
ting. Whereas, we empirically show that it is necessary
to introduce dropout layer after every non-linear layer of
the model (proposed dropout setting i.e., dropout-2D af-
ter Conv2D+ReLU layer and dropout-1D after FC+ReLU
layer) to mitigate over-fitting during single-step adversarial
training, and to enable the model to gain robustness against
adversarial attacks (single-step and multi-step attacks). We
train LeNet+ with dropout layer in typical setting and in
the proposed setting respectively, on MNIST dataset using
single-step adversarial training method for different values
of dropout probability. After training, we obtain the perfor-
mance of these resultant models against PGD attack (=0.3,
step=0.01, steps=40). Column-1 of Fig. 3 shows the trend
of accuracy of these models for PGD attack with respect
to the dropout probability used while training. It can be
observed that the gain in the robustness of adversarially
trained model with dropout layer in the proposed setting
is significantly better compared to the adversarially trained
model with dropout layer in typical setting (FAT-TS). From
column-2 of Fig. 3, it can be observed that the robustness of
adversarially trained model with dropout layer in the pro-
posed setting, increases with the increase in the dropout
probability (p) and reaches a peak value at p=0.4. Further
increase in the dropout probability causes decrease in the
accuracy on both clean and adversarial samples. Based on
this observation, we propose an improved single-step adver-
sarial training in the next subsection. Furthermore, we per-
form normal training of LeNet+ with dropout layers in typ-
ical setting and in the proposed setting, on MNIST dataset.
From column-1 of Fig. 3, it can be observed that there is no
significant improvement in the robustness of these normally
trained models.
4.2. SADS: Single-step Adversarial training with
Dropout Scheduling
Column-1 of Fig. 3 indicates that use of dropout layer in
typical setting is not sufficient to avoid over-fitting on adver-
sarial samples, and we need severe dropout regime involv-
ing all the layers (i.e., proposed setting: dropout layer after
Conv2D+ReLU and FC+ReLU layers) of the network in or-
der to avoid over-fitting. For the proposed dropout regime,
Figure 3: Column-1: Effect of dropout probability of
dropout layers in typical setting and in the proposed set-
ting on the model’s robustness against PGD attack (=0.3,
step=0.01 and steps=40). Obtained for LeNet+ trained on
MNIST dataset. NT-TS: Normal training with dropout layer
in typical setting. FAT-TS: Single-step adversarial training
with dropout layer in typical setting. NT-PS: Normal train-
ing with dropout layer in the proposed setting. Proposed:
Single-step adversarial training with dropout layer in the
proposed setting. Column-2: Effect of dropout probabil-
ity on the model’s accuracy on clean and PGD adversar-
ial validation set (=0.3, step=0.01 and steps=40). Ob-
tained for LeNet+ with dropout layer in the proposed set-
ting, trained using single-step adversarial training method
on MNIST dataset.
determining exact dropout probability is network dependent
and is difficult. Further, having high dropout probability
causes under-fitting of the model, and having low dropout
probability causes the model to over-fit on the adversarial
samples.
Based on these observations, we propose a single-step
adversarial training method with dropout scheduling (Algo-
rithm 1). In the proposed training method, we introduce
dropout layer after each non-linear layer of the model to
be trained. We initialize these dropout layers with a high
dropout probability Pd. Further, during training we linearly
decay the dropout probability of all the dropout layers and
this decay in the dropout probability is controlled by the
hyper-parameter rd. The hyper-parameter, rd is expressed
in terms of maximum training iterations (e.g., rd =1/2 im-
plies that dropout probability reaches zero when the current
training iteration is equal to half of the maximum training
iterations). In experimental section 5, we show the effec-
tiveness of the proposed training method. Note that dropout
layer is only used while training.
5. Experiments
In this section, we show the effectiveness of models
trained using the proposed single-step adversarial train-
ing method (SADS) in white-box and black-box settings.
We perform the sanity tests described in [7], in order
to verify that models trained using SADS are robust and
Algorithm 1: Single-step Adversarial training with
Dropout Scheduling (SADS)
Input:
Training mini-batch size (m)
Maximum training iterations (Maxitertion)
Hyper-parameters: Pd, rd
1 Initialization
Randomly initialize network N
iteration = 0
prob = Pd
Insert dropout layer after each non-linear layer of the
network N
Set dropout probability (p) of all the dropout layers
with prob
while iteration ≤Maxitertion do
2 Read minibatch B={x1, .., xm} from training set
3 Compute FGSM adversarial sample
{x1adv, ..., xmadv} from corresponding clean
samples {x1, ..., xm} using the current state of
the network N
4 Make new minibatch B∗ = {x1adv, ..., xmadv}
/*Forward pass, compute loss, backward pass,
and update parameters*/
5 Do one training step of Network N using
minibatch B∗
/*Update dropout probability of Dropout-1D and
Dropout-2D layers with prob*/
6 prob = max( 0, Pd · (1− iterationrd·Maxitertion ) )
7 iteration = iteration+ 1
8 end
does not exhibit obfuscated gradients (Athalye et al. [1]
demonstrated that models exhibiting obfuscated gradients
are not robust against adversarial attacks). We show re-
sults on MNIST [19], Fashion-MNIST [37] and CIFAR-
10 [16] datasets. We use LeNet+ (please refer to supple-
mentary document for details on network architecture) for
both MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets. For CIFAR-10
dataset, WideResNet-28-10 [39] is used. These models are
trained using SGD with momentum. Step-policy is used for
learning rate scheduling. For all datasets, images are pre-
processed to be in [0,1] range. For CIFAR-10, random crop
and horizontal flip are performed for data-augmentation.
Evaluation: We show the performance of models against
adversarial attacks in white-box and black-box setting. For
SADS, we report mean and standard deviation over three
runs.
Attacks: For l∞ based attacks, we use Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [13], Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method
(IFGSM) [17], Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign
Method (MI-FGSM) [10] and Projected Gradient Descent
Table 1: MNIST: White-Box setting. Classification accu-
racy (%) of models trained on MNIST dataset using differ-
ent training methods. For all attacks =0.3 is used and for
PGD attack step=0.01 is used. For both IFGSM and PGD
attacks, steps is set to 40.
Training Attack Method
Method Clean FGSM IFGSM PGD
NT 99.24 11.65 0.31 0.01
Multi-step adversarial training
PAT 98.41 95.56 92.64 92.08
TRADES 98.70 96.30 95.14 95.05
Single-step adversarial training
FAT 99.34 89.04 1.19 0.17
SADS 98.89 94.78 89.35 88.51
±0.01 ±0.19 ±0.09 ±0.22
Table 2: Fashion-MNIST: White-Box attack. Classifica-
tion accuracy (%) of models trained on Fashion-MNIST
dataset using different training methods. For all attacks
=0.1 is used and for PGD attack step=0.01 is used. For
both IFGSM and PGD attacks, steps is set to 40.
Training Attack Method
Method Clean FGSM IFGSM PGD
NT 91.42 6.46 1.01 0.16
Multi-step adversarial training
PAT 84.55 77.30 75.95 75.18
TRADES 86.69 80.39 78.94 78.04
Single-step adversarial training
FAT 90.45 83.43 21.26 16.65
SADS 85.21 75.81 71.14 69.51
±0.08 ±1.31 ±1.01 ±1.43
(PGD) [22]. For l2 based attack, we use DeepFool [24] and
Carlini & Wagner [8].
Perturbation size: For l∞ based attacks, we set pertur-
bation size () to the values described in [22] i.e., =0.3,
0.1 and 8/255 for MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets respectively.
Comparisons: We compare the performance of the pro-
posed single-step adversarial training method (SADS)
with Normal training (NT), FGSM adversarial training
(FAT) [18], Ensemble adversarial training (EAT) [35], PGD
adversarial training (PAT) [22], and TRADES [40]. Note
that, FAT, EAT and SADS (ours) are single-step adversarial
training methods, whereas PAT and TRADES are multi-step
adversarial training methods. Results for EAT are shown in
supplementary document.
Table 3: CIFAR-10: White-Box attack. Classification ac-
curacy (%) of models trained on CIFAR-10 dataset using
different training methods. For all attacks =8/255 is used
and for PGD attack step=2/255 is used. For both IFGSM
and PGD attacks, steps is set to 7.
Training Attack Method
Method Clean FGSM IFGSM PGD
NT 94.75 28.16 0.07 0.03
Multi-step adversarial training
PAT 85.70 53.96 48.65 47.23
TRADES 87.20 56.34 51.21 50.03
Single-step adversarial training
FAT 94.04 98.54 0.31 0.09
SADS 82.01 51.99 46.37 45.66
±0.06 ±1.02 ±1.17 ±1.26
5.1. Performance in White-box setting
We train models on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets respectively, using NT, FAT, PAT,
TRADES and SADS (Algorithm 1) training methods.
Models are trained for 50, 50 and 100 epochs on MNIST,
Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets respectively. For
SADS, we set the hyper-parameter Pd and rd to (0.8, 0.5),
(0.8, 0.75) and (0.5, 0.5) for MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets respectively. Table 1, 2 and 3 shows
the performance of these models against single-step and
multi-step attacks in white-box setting, rows represent the
training method and columns represent the attack genera-
tion method. It can be observed that models trained using
FAT are not robust against multi-step attacks. Whereas,
models trained using PAT, TRADES and SADS are robust
against both single-step and multi-step attacks. Unlike PAT
and TRADES, the proposed SADS method is a single-step
adversarial training method.
PGD attack with large steps: Engstrom et al. [11]
demonstrated that the performance of models trained using
certain adversarial training methods degrade significantly
with increase in the number of steps of PGD attack. In
order to verify that such behavior is not observed in models
trained using SADS, we obtain the plot of classification
accuracy on PGD test-set versus steps of PGD attack. Fig. 4
shows these plots obtained for models trained using PAT
and SADS on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets respectively. It can be observed that the accuracy
of models on PGD test set initially decreases slightly and
then saturates. Even for PGD attack with large steps, there
is no significant degradation in the performance of models
trained using PAT and SADS methods. In supplementary
document, we show the effect of hyper-parameters of the
proposed training method.
Figure 4: Plot of accuracy of the model trained using PAT and SADS, on PGD adversarial test set versus steps of PGD attack
with fixed . For PGD attack we set (,step) to (0.3,0.01), (0.1,0.01) and (8/255,2/255) for MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets. Note, x-axis is in logarithmic scale.
Figure 5: Plot of accuracy versus perturbation size of PGD attack, obtained for models trained using SADS. It can be observed
that the accuracy of the model is zero for PGD attack with large perturbation size.
Table 4: Black-box setting: Performance of models trained
on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets us-
ing different training method, against adversarial attacks
in black-box setting. Source models are used for generat-
ing adversarial samples, and the target models are tested on
these generated adversarial samples.
MNIST
Source Model Target ModelNT FAT PAT SADS
Model-A FGSM (=0.3) 29.09 79.49 96.01 95.06MI-FGSM (=0.3, steps=40) 10.69 72.44 95.83 94.80
Model-B FGSM (=0.3) 28.13 72.39 96.15 95.11MI-FGSM (=0.3, steps=40) 12.32 70.79 95.97 94.81
Fashion-MNIST
Model-A FGSM (=0.1) 36.66 88.26 81.32 80.86MI-FGSM (=0.1, steps=40) 33.04 88.36 81.20 80.68
Model-B FGSM (=0.1) 39.03 85.40 80.01 78.94MI-FGSM (=0.1, steps=40) 38.01 84.72 79.84 78.59
CIFAR-10
VGG-11 FGSM (=8/255) 48.46 78.70 78.12 77.97MI-FGSM (=8/255, steps=7) 31.61 76.35 78.36 77.95
DenseNet- FGSM (=8/255) 39.58 86.90 80.29 80.06
BC-100 MI-FGSM (=8/255, steps=7) 28.50 86.42 80.42 80.28
5.2. Performance in Black-box setting
In this subsection, we show the performance of models
trained using different training methods against adversarial
attacks in black-box setting. Typically, a substitute model
(source model) is trained on the same task using normal
training method, and this trained substitute model is used
for generating adversarial samples. The generated adver-
sarial samples are transferred to the deployed model (tar-
get model). We use FGSM and MI-FGSM methods for
generating adversarial samples, since samples generated us-
ing these methods show good transfer rates [10]. Table 4
shows the performance of models trained using different
methods, in black-box setting. It can be observed that the
performance of models trained using PAT and SADS in
black-box setting is better than that in white-box setting.
Further, it can be observed that the performance of mod-
els trained on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets using FAT
is worse in black-box setting than compared in white-box
setting. Please refer to supplementary file for details on net-
work architecture of source models.
5.3. Performance against DeepFool and C&W at-
tacks
DeepFool [24] and C&W [8] attacks generate adversar-
ial perturbations with minimum l2 norm, that is required to
fool the classifier. These methods measure the robustness
of the model in terms of the average l2 norm of the gener-
ated adversarial perturbations for the test set. For an unde-
fended model, adversarial perturbation with small l2 norm
Table 5: DeepFool and C&W attacks: Performance of models trained using different training methods against DeepFool
and C&W attacks. These attack methods measure the robustness of the model based on the average l2 norm of the generated
perturbations, higher the better. Success defines the percentage of samples of test set that has been misclassified. Note that,
for models trained using PAT and SADS, perturbations with relatively large l2 norm is required to fool the classifier.
Method
MNIST F-MNIST CIFAR-10
DeepFool CW DeepFool CW DeepFool CW
Success Mean l2 Success Mean l2 Success Mean l2 Success Mean l2 Success Mean l2 Success Mean l2
NT 99.35 1.837 100 1.659 93.73 0.796 100 0.709 96 0.20 100 0.12
FAT 99.37 1.455 100 0.798 93.11 1.514 100 1.167 96 0.25 100 0.10
PAT 85.68 4.633 99 2.779 90.29 2.635 100 1.572 92 1.22 100 0.88
SADS 95.89 3.692 100 2.321 90.68 2.305 100 1.308 93 0.97 100 0.71
±0.06 ±0.033 0± ±0.027 ±0.26 ±0.102 ±0 ±0.188 ±0.32 ±0.043 ±0 ±0.014
Table 6: Comparison of training time per epoch of mod-
els trained on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets respectively,
obtained for different training methods.
Method Training time per epoch (sec.)MNIST CIFAR-10
NT ∼ 2.7 ∼ 104
FAT ∼ 4.1 ∼ 159
PAT ∼ 53 ∼ 820
TRADES ∼ 104 ∼ 1558
SADS ∼ 4.3 ∼ 187
is enough to fool the classifier. Whereas for robust models,
adversarial perturbation with relatively large l2 norm is re-
quired to fool the classifier. Table 5, shows the performance
of models trained using NT, FAT, PAT and SADS methods,
against DeepFool and C&W attacks. It can be observed that
models trained using PAT and SADS have relatively large
average l2 norm. Whereas, for models trained using NT
and FAT have small average l2 norm.
5.4. Sanity tests
We perform sanity tests described in [7] to verify
whether models trained using SADS are adversarially ro-
bust and are not exhibiting obfuscated gradients. We per-
form following sanity tests:
• Iterative attacks should perform better than non-
iterative attacks
• White-box attacks should perform better than black-
box attacks
• Unbounded attacks should reach 100% success
• Increasing distortion bound should increase attack
success rate
Models trained using SADS pass above tests. From ta-
ble 1, 2 and 3, it can be observed that iterative attacks
(IFGSM and PGD) are stronger than non-iterative attack
(FGSM) for models trained using SADS. Comparing results
in Tables 1, 2 and 3 with results in Table 4, it can be ob-
served that white-box attacks are stronger than black-box
attacks for models trained using SADS. Fig. 5 shows the ac-
curacy plot for the model on test set versus perturbation size
of PGD attack, obtained for models trained using SADS. It
can be observed that the model’s accuracy falls to zero for
large perturbation size (). From Fig. 5, it can be observed
that PGD attack success rate (attack success rate is equal to
(100 - model’s accuracy)%) increases with increase in the
distortion bound (perturbation size) of the attack.
5.5. Time Complexity
In order to quantify the complexity of different training
methods, we measure training time per epoch (seconds) for
models trained using different training methods. Table 6
shows the training time per epoch for models trained on
MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets respectively. Note that the
training time of SADS and FAT is of the same order. The
increase in the training time for PAT and TRADES is due
to their iterative nature of generating adversarial samples.
We ran this timing experiment on a machine with NVIDIA
Titan Xp GPU, with no other jobs on this GPU.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we have demonstrated that models trained
using single-step adversarial training methods learn to
prevent the generation of adversaries due to over-fitting of
the model during the initial stages of training. To mitigate
this effect, we have proposed a novel single-step adversarial
training method with dropout scheduling. Unlike existing
single-step adversarial training methods, models trained
using the proposed method achieves robustness not only
against single-step attacks but also against multi-step
attacks. Further, the performance of models trained using
the proposed method is on par with models trained using
multi-step adversarial training methods, and is much faster
than multi-step adversarial training methods.
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Supplementary
S 1. Contents
• Section S 2: Network architecture.
• Section S 3: Adversarial training and Attack genera-
tion methods.
• Section S 4: Additional plots to illustrate over-fitting
effect during single-step adversarial training.
• Section S 5: Effect of hyper-parameters
• Section S 6: Comparison with EAT
• Section S 7: Trend of R, training and validation loss
during SADS.
S 2. Network Architecture
Network architecture of models used for MNIST and
Fashion-MNIST datasets are shown in Table 7. Model-A
and Model-B are used for generating adversarial samples in
black-box setting.
S 3. Adversarial training and Attack genera-
tion methods
S 3.1. Adversarial Sample Generation Methods
In this subsection, we discuss the formulation of adver-
sarial attacks.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): Non-iterative attack
method proposed by [13]. This method generates l∞ norm
bounded adversarial perturbation based on the linear ap-
proximation of loss function.
x∗ = x+ .sign(∇xJ(f(x; θ), ytrue)) (3)
Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (IFGSM) [17]: Iter-
ative version of FGSM attack. At each iteration, adversarial
perturbation of small step size (α) is added to the image. In
our experiments, we set α = /steps.
x0 = x (4)
xN+1 = xN + α.sign
(∇xNJ(f(xN ; θ), ytrue)) (5)
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [22]: Initially, a small
random noise sampled from Uniform distribution (U ) is
added to the image. Then at each iteration, perturbation of
small step size (step) is added to the image, and followed
by re-projection.
x0 = x+ U
(− step, step, shape(x)) (6)
xN+1 = xN + step.sign
(∇xNJ(f(xN ; θ), ytrue))(7)
xN+1 = clip
(
xN+1,min = x− ,max = x+ ) (8)
Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method
(MI-FGSM) [10]: Introduces a momentum term into the
IFGSM formulation. Here, µ represents the momentum
term. α represents step size and is set to /steps.
x0 = x (9)
gN+1 = µ.gN +
∇xNJ(f(xN ; θ), ytrue)
||∇xNJ(f(xN ; θ), ytrue)||1
(10)
xN+1 = xN + α.sign
(
gN+1
)
(11)
S 3.2. Adversarial Training Methods
In this subsection we explain the existing adversarial
training methods.
Table 7: Architecture of networks used for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets.
LeNet+ Model-A Model-B Model-C Model-D
Conv(32,5,5) + Relu Conv(64,5,5) + Relu Dropout(0.2) Conv(128,3,3) + Tanh { FC(300) +Relu }× 4MaxPool(2,2) Conv(64,5,5) + Relu Conv(64,8,8) + Relu MaxPool(2,2) Dropout(0.5)
Conv(64,5,5) + Relu Dropout(0.25) Conv(128,6,6) + Relu Conv(64,3,3) + Tanh FC + Softmax
MaxPool(2,2) FC(128) + Relu Conv(128,5,5) + Relu MaxPool(2,2)
FC(1024) + Relu Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) FC(128) + Relu
FC + Softmax FC + Softmax FC + Softmax FC + Softmax
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Figure 6: Single-step adversarial training: Trend of validation loss during single-step adversarial training, obtained for
ResNet-34 trained on CIFAR-10 dataset. Adversarial validation set is generated using column-1: ResNet-34, column-2:
ResNet-18, column-3: VGG-16 and column-4: VGG-19.
Figure 7: Single-step adversarial training: Trend of validation loss during single-step adversarial training, obtained for
LeNet+ trained on MNIST dataset. Adversarial validation set is generated using column-1: Model-A, column-2: Model-B,
column-3: Model-C and column-4: Model-D.
FGSM Adversarial Training (FAT): During training, at
each iteration a portion of clean samples in the mini-batch
are replaced with their corresponding adversarial samples
generated using the model being trained. Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) is used for generating these adver-
sarial samples.
Ensemble Adversarial Training (EAT) [35]: At each
iteration a portion of clean samples in the mini-batch
are replaced with their corresponding adversarial samples.
These adversarial samples are generated by the model be-
ing trained or by one of the model from the fixed set of
pre-trained models. Table 8 shows the setup used for EAT
method.
PGD Adversarial Training (PAT): Multi-step adversarial
training method proposed by [22]. At each iteration all the
clean samples in the mini-batch are replaced with their cor-
responding adversarial samples generated using the model
being trained. Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) method is
used for generating these samples.
TRADES: Multi-step adversarial training method proposed
by [40]. The method proposes a regularizer that encour-
ages the output of the network to be smooth. The training
mini-batches contain clean and their corresponding adver-
sarial samples. These adversarial samples are generated us-
ing Projected Gradient Descent with modified loss function.
S 4. Additional plots to illustrate over-fitting
effect
In the main paper, we showed over-fitting effect during
training of LeNet+ on MNIST dataset using single-step ad-
versarial training. Fig. 6 shows the plot of validation loss,
obtained for ResNet-34 trained on CIFAR-10 dataset using
single-step adversarial training. We observe over-fitting ef-
fect even when model with different architecture is used for
generating adversarial validation set. Fig. 7 shows the vali-
dation loss obtained for LeNet+ trained on MNIST dataset
using single-step adversarial training. Normally trained
models with different architecture are used for generating
adversarial validation set.
Figure 8: Effect of hyper-parameter Pd and rd of SADS
Figure 9: MNIST: Trend of R, training loss, and validation loss during SADS training method, obtained for LeNet+ trained
on MNIST dataset. Column-1: plot of R versus iteration. Column-2: training loss versus iteration. Column-3: validation
loss versus iteration. Note that, for the entire training duration R does not decay, and no over-fitting effect can be observed.
Figure 10: Fashion-MNIST: Trend of R, training loss, and validation loss during SADS training method, obtained for
LeNet+ trained on Fashion-MNIST dataset. Column-1: plot of R versus iteration. Column-2: training loss versus iteration.
Column-3: validation loss versus iteration. Note that, for the entire training duration R does not decay, and no over-fitting
effect can be observed.
S 5. Effect of Hyper-Parameters
In order to show the effect of hyper-parameters, we train
LeNet+ shown in table 7 on MNIST dataset, using SADS
with different hyper-parameter settings. Validation set accu-
racy of the model for PGD attack ( = 0.3 and steps = 40)
is obtained for each hyper-parameter setting with one of
them being fixed and the other being varied.
Effect of hyper-parameter Pd: The hyper-parameter Pd
defines the initial dropout probability applied to all dropout
layers. We train LeNet+ on MNIST dataset, using the pro-
posed method for different initial dropout probability Pd.
Column-1 of Fig. 8 shows the effect of varying dropout
probability from 0.3 to 0.9. It can be observed that the ro-
bustness of the model to multi-step attack initially increases
with the increase in the value of Pd (Pd < 0.8), and further
increase in Pd causes the model’s robustness to decrease,
and this is due to under-fitting.
Effect of hyper-parameter rd: The hyper-parameter rd de-
cides the iteration at which dropout probability reaches zero
and is expressed in terms of maximum training iteration.
Column-2 of Fig. 8 shows the effect varying rd from 1/4 to
1. It can be observed that for rd < 0.5, there is degradation
in the robustness of the model against multi-step attacks.
This is because, during the initial stages of training, learning
rate is high and the model can easily over-fit to adversaries
generated by single-step method.
S 6. Comparison with Ensemble Adversarial
Training
We train WideResNet-28-10 [39] on CIFAR-10 [16]
dataset using EAT and SADS. Table 8 shows the setup used
for EAT. Pre-trained models are used for generating ad-
versarial samples during EAT. Table 9 shows the recogni-
tion accuracy of models trained using EAT and SADS in
white-box attack setting. It can be observed that the model
trained using SADS is robust to both single-step (FGSM)
and multi-step attacks (PGD), whereas models trained us-
ing EAT are susceptible to multi-step attack.
S 7. SADS: Trend of R, training and valida-
tion loss
Fig. 9 and 10 show the trend of R, training and vali-
dation loss, obtained for models trained using SADS. It can
be observed that for the entire training duration R does not
decay and no over-fitting effect can be observed.
Table 8: Setup used for Ensemble Adversarial Training.
Network to be trained Pre-trained Models
WRN-28-10 (Ens-A) WRN-28-10, ResNet-34
CIFAR-10 WRN-28-10 (Ens-B) WRN-28-10, VGG-19
WRN-28-10 (Ens-C) ResNet-34, VGG-19
Table 9: CIFAR-10: White-Box attack. Classification ac-
curacy (%) of models trained on CIFAR-10 dataset using
different training methods. For all attacks =8/255 is used
and for PGD attack step=2/255 and steps=7 is used.
Training Attack Method
Method Clean FGSM PGD-7
EAT Ens-A 92.92 59.56 19.21
EAT Ens-B 92.75 63.40 5.34
EAT Ens-C 93.11 59.74 12.03
SADS 82.01 51.99 45.66
±0.06 ±1.02 ±1.26
